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GETTING TO “SOMETIMES”†: 
EXPANDING TEACHERS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS THROUGH 
“GARCETTI’S CAVEAT”‡  
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “education is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments.”1 Public 
schools2 must “inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary [for] the 
maintenance of a democratic political system,”3 while also developing 
“leaders . . . through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of 
ideas.”4 Even though the fulfillment of these aims is primarily the 
province of state and local officials, public schools must not 
contravene the Constitution in the service of their educational 
missions.5 The Court’s “public schools jurisprudence”6 has 
                                                                                                                 
† Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The proper 
answer to the question ‘whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from 
discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties’ is ‘Sometimes,’ not 
‘Never.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
‡ Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010). 
1
 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2
 This Note uses the term “school” to denote educational institutions of the primary and 
secondary levels and “university” to represent those of higher learning. Similarly, for the 
purposes of this Note, “teacher” refers to educators in schools, whereas “professor” identifies 
their counterparts at universities. 
3
 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). 
4
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5
 David Fellman, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND EDUCATION vii, vii–ix 
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established that the First Amendment requires school officials to 
accommodate some student speech in the process of educating the 
nation’s youth.7 Beyond the Court’s 1968 declaration in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District that, like students, 
“teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”8 however, the Court 
has not provided school officials with any explicit guidance regarding 
the extent to which they must tolerate teachers’ speech in the course 
of their instructional duties.9 
To determine whether the Constitution protects teachers’ 
classroom speech, then, the United States Courts of Appeals have 
looked to one or more analogous First Amendment perspectives.10 
                                                                                                                 
 
(David Fellman ed., 1969). 
6
 James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337 
(2000). 
7
 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (requiring a 
“legitimate pedagogical concern[ ]” for restrictions on “student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (permitting the 
punishment of “offensively lewd and indecent speech” in schools); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 
(prohibiting school officials from disciplining students for their speech unless the speech could 
cause “a substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”). For a 
discussion of these cases, see infra Part I.B. 
8
 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
9
 See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has definitively resolved whether and to what 
extent a teacher’s instructional speech is protected by the First Amendment.”). Compare Evans-
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never 
removed in-class speech from its presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment.”), 
with id. at 235 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the First 
Amendment applies to a teacher's classroom speech.). 
This Note refers to this type of teacher speech as “classroom speech.” 
10
 Most courts and commentators have treated the judicial approach to this issue as a 
choice between two alternatives: the test for public-employee speech from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138 (1983), and the test for school-sponsored student speech from Hazelwood. See, e.g., 
Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–77 (10th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Hazelwood test 
to determine whether the First Amendment protected a teacher’s classroom speech despite the 
district court’s decision, and the parties’ arguments, that the Pickering-Connick test applied); 
Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on 
School Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (2008) (noting the circuit split between 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which apply Pickering-Connick to First 
Amendment retaliation cases involving teachers’ classroom speech, and the First, Second, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which apply Hazelwood).  
At least one court has described the availability of three analytical options: Pickering-
Connick, Hazelwood, and the test for government speech from Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1448–49, 1449 n.6 (assuming arguendo that Hazelwood 
applied to teachers’ use of languages other than English in the classroom instead of Pickering-
Connick or Rust-Rosenberger because, in the court’s opinion, “it appear[ed] to be more speech-
protective than the two alternatives”); see also Evans-Marshall, 428 F.3d at 234–36 (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (recommending that the Sixth Circuit “re-examine its First Amendment 
2012] GETTING TO “SOMETIMES” 1207 
First, courts have viewed teachers as public employees and, applying 
the test that the Supreme Court first announced in Pickering v. Board 
of Education11 and later refined in Connick v. Myers,12 have balanced 
teachers’ interests in speaking as citizens on matters of public concern 
against schools’ interests in their ability to provide an education for 
their students.13 Second, courts have seen schools as nonpublic fora 
with “special characteristics”14 and, under Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier,15 have looked for the legitimate pedagogical concerns 
underlying schools’ restrictions on teachers’ classroom speech.16 
Third, at least one court has considered identifying the school itself, 
rather than the teacher, as the speaker, citing Rust v. Sullivan17 and 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia18 for the 
proposition that that school officials should have the ability to control 
the content of the educational message that their students receive.19 
                                                                                                                 
 
jurisprudence in the context of in-class curricular speech” in light of the principles established in 
Rust and Rosenberger); Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing 
First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 64 (2008) (referring to the 
Fourth Circuit’s characterization of the Third Circuit’s use of Rust and Rosenberger to 
determine the protection that the Constitution affords teachers’ classroom speech). 
Courts and commentators have also found that the principle of academic freedom bears on 
the question. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Keyishian 
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), for the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
importance of the precise speech regulations in light of teachers’ “vital First Amendment rights” 
in that marketplace of ideas that is the classroom and concluding that schools must not only 
have a legitimate pedagogical interest in restricting teachers’ classroom speech but also must 
provide teachers with notice of prohibited speech); ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE 
UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 204 (2009) (“The issue is also 
complicated by the notion of academic freedom, which although not explicitly a part of the First 
Amendment is nonetheless woven—often in a haphazard fashion—through analyses of an 
educator’s right of expression.”); Anne Gardner, Note, Preparing Students for Democratic 
Participation: Why Teacher Curricular Speech Should Sometimes Be Protected by the First 
Amendment, 73 MO. L. REV. 213, 214 (2008) (“Among the circuit courts, teacher curricular 
speech is governed by three competing doctrines: public employee speech, student speech, and 
academic freedom.”). 
This Note considers all four of these precedential lines as First Amendment perspectives 
on the degree to which teachers’ classroom speech warrants constitutional protection. 
11
 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
12
 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
13
 See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s decision to invite a speaker to address 
her class about the benefits of industrial hemp production). 
14
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
15
 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
16
 See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a school board member’s guest 
lecture that included “[d]epictions of bare-chested women”). 
17
 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
18
 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
19
 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 235–36 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J. 
concurring) (outlining a new direction for the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding the 
protection that the First Amendment affords to teachers’ classroom speech); cf. Edwards v. Cal. 
139
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Finally, courts have also regarded teachers as First Amendment 
figures under Keyishian v. Board of Regents20 and have considered 
the extent to which schools’ right to “fix the curriculum”21 must 
accommodate teachers’ responsibility to expose students to the 
marketplace of ideas.22 
The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos23 
“dramatically changed the [First Amendment] landscape”24 from the 
first of these four perspectives. Instead of evaluating the nature of a 
public employee’s speech and engaging in the “particularized 
balancing”25 of the employee’s interest in that speech against the 
public employer’s interest in the efficient provision of its services, the 
Garcetti Court announced that the First Amendment offers no 
protection for a public employee’s speech “made pursuant to . . . [that 
employee’s] official responsibilities.”26 Because “[t]here is some 
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests,”27 
however, the Court qualified the scope of its holding, suggesting that 
the First Amendment may offer some protection to a public 
employee’s speech related to “scholarship or teaching.”28  
Despite “Garcetti’s caveat,”29 judicial responses to the decision in 
the circuit courts have been no more sensitive to teachers’ First 
Amendment rights in the classroom, but rather have, on the whole, 
been more restrictive.30 As a result, it is not surprising that one 
                                                                                                                 
 
Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a university, rather than a 
tenured professor, was the speaker with regard to the content of a course on educational 
technology). 
20
 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
21
 Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
22
 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing school 
officials to set the parameters of what teachers may communicate in the classroom, but requiring 
that teachers receive notice of prohibited expression); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 
F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to “delineate the scope of academic freedom afforded 
to teachers under the First Amendment,” but concluding that it does not “extend to [the choice 
of] curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or 
dictates”); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(“Although, the concept of academic freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the 
doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of the public school curricula.”).  
23
 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
24
 Doucette v. Minocqua Hazelhurst & Lake Tomahawk Joint Sch. Dist., No. 07–cv–292–
bbc, 2008 WL 2412988, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008). 
25
 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). 
26
 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
27




 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010). 
30
 See, e.g., id. at 338–40 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a high school 
English teacher’s use of a novel that the school district had purchased for instructional 
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commentator has suggested that “Garcetti may ultimately prove the 
death knell for any meaningful First Amendment rights for [teachers’] 
classroom related communications.”31 In light of the limited extent of 
those rights before Garcetti, however, there is some consensus that 
Garcetti’s “practical impact . . . may be minimal.”32  
While others have noted that Garcetti may be a reason for mild 
optimism,33 this Note argues that Garcetti represents the best 
opportunity for the expansion of teachers’ First Amendment rights in 
the classroom since Tinker’s pronouncement that respect for the 
constitutional rights of students and teachers is a mandatory 
component of the public school curriculum.34 Through an 
examination of each of the four First Amendment perspectives on this 
issue, Part I of this Note explains the scope of teachers’ rights to free 
expression in the classroom before Garcetti. Part II then discusses the 
Garcetti decision and the ways in which it has affected circuit courts’ 
views of teachers’ classroom speech. Analyzing the circuit courts’ 
pre- and post-Garcetti jurisprudence, Part III of this Note argues that 
courts certainly could, and perhaps should, use Garcetti’s caveat to 
treat teachers’ classroom speech in such way that respects teachers’ 
role as servants not only of the public schools, but also the First 
Amendment. 
I. TEACHERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE CLASSROOM 
BEFORE GARCETTI 
A. A Public Employee’s Right to Free Expression in the Classroom 
Before Garcetti, one First Amendment perspective that circuit 
courts used to determine whether the First Amendment protected a 
teacher’s classroom speech adopted the Supreme Court’s public-
                                                                                                                 
 
purposes); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 689 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a high 
school teacher’s posting of material with religious themes on a classroom bulletin board did not 
warrant constitutional protection); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 
478–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect an elementary 
teacher’s statement regarding her participation in demonstrations against the war in Iraq during 
a current-events lesson). For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part II. 
31
 Hutchens, supra note 10, at 62. 
32
 Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 225 (2008); see 
also Hutchens, supra note 10, at 62 (“[R]ecent years, with some exceptions, have already 
witnessed a general judicial resistance to First Amendment rights for teachers.”). 
33
 See, e.g., DUPRE, supra note 10, at 226 (“The upshot is that after Garcetti, the extent of 
First Amendment protection—if it exists at all—is still a matter of speculation until the Court 
revisits the issue.”). 
34
 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
140
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employee speech jurisprudence,35 rooted in Pickering v. Board of 
Education36 and Connick v. Myers.37 In Pickering, the Supreme Court 
held that school officials violated Marvin Pickering’s First 
Amendment rights when they discharged Pickering from his teaching 
position because of a letter that he sent to a local newspaper 
criticizing the school board and, in the process, announced a new test 
for evaluating whether a public employee’s speech enjoys 
constitutional protection.38 The Court stated that “teachers may [not] 
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment 
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters 
of public interest in connection with the operation of the public 
schools in which they work.”39 On the other hand, the Court 
recognized that “the State has interests as an employer in regulating 
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it 
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry 
in general.”40 The Court, therefore, sought to find “a balance between 
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters 
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”41 Because the Court found that Pickering’s criticism of 
school officials did not “impede[] the teacher's proper performance of 
his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfere[] with the regular 
operation of the schools generally,”42 it concluded that the school 
board’s interest in restricting Pickering’s speech was no greater than 
its interest in restricting the speech of an ordinary citizen and, 
                                                                                                                 
35
 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005); Cockrel v. 
Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 
1172 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Gardner, supra note 10, at 220 
(“Several appellate courts have applied the Pickering balancing test to teacher curricular 
speech.”); Zachary Martin, Comment, Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights: In 
Danger in the Wake of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (2008) (“When 
dealing with the issue of whether a public school teacher’s speech is constitutionally protected, 
several circuits have applied the rules established in Pickering and Connick.”). 
36
 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
37
 461 U.S. 138 (1983).  
38
 Pickering, 391 U.S. 564–65, 568–70; see also, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, Academic 
Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (describing 
Pickering as “profoundly redefin[ing] the expressive rights of public employees”); Susan P. 
Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 
1289 (2008) (describing Pickering’s place in “the pantheon of First Amendment 
jurisprudence”). 
39






 Id. at 572–73. 
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consequently, that the board could not discipline Pickering for his 
speech without violating the First Amendment.43 
Thirteen years later, in Connick v. Myers,44 the Court clarified the 
application of Pickering’s balancing test.45 In Connick, the Court held 
that the First Amendment did not protect a questionnaire that Shelia 
Myers, an assistant district attorney, distributed to her coworkers 
seeking their opinions about the district attorney and the policies of 
his office.46 The Court emphasized the importance of the “public 
concern” dimension of the Pickering test and concluded that an 
evaluation of a public employer’s interest in discharging an employee 
because of that employee’s speech is only appropriate when the 
speech “can[] be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”47 Considering, 
then, the “content, form, and context” of Myers’s questionnaire,48 the 
Court found that one of the questions touched a matter of public 
concern because it sought information regarding any pressure that 
Myers’s fellow attorneys may have felt to work on certain political 
campaigns, which the Court had previously recognized as a “coercion 
of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights”49 and 
which was related to the “interest in this country that government 
service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than 
political service.”50 From this finding, the Court proceeded to balance 
Myers’s limited interest in “an employee grievance concerning 
internal office policy”51 against the district attorney’s reasonable 
belief that the questionnaire would “disrupt the office, undermine his 
authority, and destroy close working relationships,”52 concluding that 
the district attorney’s interests were more significant and, therefore, 
that Myers’s discharge did not violate the First Amendment.53 
When circuit courts viewed teachers as public employees and 
applied Pickering-Connick’s two-part test, teachers’ classroom speech 
received very little First Amendment protection.54 The United States 




 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
45
 See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 10, at 82 (“The Court continued to elucidate its 
approach [to public employees’ First Amendment rights] in [Connick].”). 
46
 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140–41, 154.  
47
 Id. at 146. 
48
 Id. at 147–8. 
49










 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (holding that a high school drama teacher’s selection of a play for her students to 
perform did not warrant First Amendment protection); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 
141
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 1990 decision in Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Board of Education55 represents perhaps the firmest 
judicial rejection of a public employee’s right to free expression in the 
classroom.56 In Bradley, the Third Circuit held that school officials 
did not violate Diane Murray’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting 
her use of Learnball, a classroom management technique that brings 
the excitement of sport into the classroom by engaging students in 
competitive educational exercises for extrinsic rewards.57 Although it 
noted that Pickering does afford teachers the possibility of a 
constitutional safeguard for their speech, the court stated that this 
protection did not extend to teachers’ expression in the classroom.58 
The Third Circuit offered no rationale of its own to support this 
conclusion,59 but cited Clark v. Holmes,60 a 1972 case in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a 
professor’s emphasis on the subject of sex in a health survey course, 
in violation of his supervisors’ direct instructions, failed, under 
                                                                                                                 
 
F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a high school 
teacher’s use of an instructional method over school officials’ objections); Kirkland v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First Amendment did not 
protect a high school teacher’s use of a nonapproved supplemental reading list in his world 
history course); Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 864–65 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
the Constitution did not protect the encouragement that a high school journalism teacher gave to 
his students to publish articles on controversial topics). But see Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 
428 F.3d 223, 231–32 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court’s grant of the school 
district’s motion to dismiss was erroneous because the First Amendment might protect a high 
school English teacher’s alleged use of curricular materials that the school district had 
approved); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s selection of a speaker to address her class about 
the benefits of industrial hemp production). 
55
 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990). 
56
 See, e.g., Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of 
Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 599 (1999) (noting that, in 
Bradley, the Third Circuit held that “a teacher’s in class speech was simply not protected by the 
First Amendment”); Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 18 (2001) (“The Third Circuit . . . flatly stated [in Bradley] that 
classroom speech receives no protection under Pickering.”); Kimberly Gee, Establishing a 
Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. & 
EDUC. 409, 436 (2009) (“[Bradley] indicates that the Third Circuit appears unwilling to extend 
any First Amendment protection to teacher expression that occurs inside the classroom.”). 
57
 Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174–76. Murray also claimed that the school’s ban on Learnball 
violated her right to academic freedom. Id. at 1175. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part 
I.D. 
For more on Learnball, see generally LEARNBALL FOR DISCIPLINE, WORK, ATTENDANCE, 
http://www.learnball.com (last visited June 1, 2012). 
58
 Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1176.  
59
 The court did, however, point to the fact that, at the time of its decision, “no court ha[d] 
found that teachers’ First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or 
classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates.” Id.  
60
 Id. (citing Clark v. Holmes,474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)). 
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Pickering, to warrant First Amendment protection.61 As in Clark, 
Murray sought the right to use Learnball despite an express school 
policy,62 but the Third Circuit did not limit its holding to those 
circumstances where a teacher’s speech conflicts with an official 
prohibition.63 
Other circuit courts have offered more explanation for their 
decisions to deny teachers’ classroom speech First Amendment 
protection from the public-employee perspective, finding that such 
speech did not satisfy Connick’s “matter of public concern” 
requirement.64 In Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
First Amendment did not protect Timothy Kirkland’s use of an 
unapproved supplemental reading list in his world history course.65 
“With little difficulty,”66 the Fifth Circuit found that Kirkland’s 
reading list did not touch a matter of public concern because, if the 
use of the list was a response to a censorial administrative approval 
requirement as Kirkland claimed, he “never attended public meetings 
to register his opposition to [the school’s] world history reading list 
. . . [or] announced to colleagues, superiors, or the public that the 
school-supplied list impinged on his right to speak freely.”67 The 
court further emphasized that “most significantly, [Kirkland] never 
afforded [the school] an opportunity to pass upon the merits of his 
list” and that he could not “remain mute and thereafter self-servingly 
label his conduct to be a matter of public concern.”68 Even though the 
Kirkland court described its “matter of public concern” analysis as 
“imprecise,”69 it eschewed any consideration of the importance of the 
subject matter of the books on the reading list,70 framing the list’s use 
                                                                                                                 
61
 Clark, 474 F.2d at 929–32. 
62
 Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174. 
63
 See supra note 56. 
64
 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989). 
65
 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795–96. 
66






 Id. at 799. 
70
 Id. at 798–99 (“[I]ssues do not rise to a level of ‘public concern’ by virtue of the 
speaker’s interest in the subject matter; rather they achieve that protected status if the words or 
conduct are conveyed by the teacher in his role as a citizen and not in his role as an employee of 
the school district.”) The court supported this subject-matter exclusion by quoting the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Connick that “[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a 
government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark . . . would plant 
the seed of a constitutional case.” Id. at 799 n.11 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 
(1983)). See R. Weston Donehower, Note, Boring Lessons: Defining the Limits of a Teacher’s 
First Amendment Right to Speak Through the Curriculum, 102 MICH. L. REV. 517, 523–24, 524 
n.47 (2003) (citing Kirkland as an example of the analytical choice that some circuit courts 
142
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instead as a protest against an approval requirement for supplemental 
materials.71  
Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly state that Kirkland 
prevented teachers’ classroom speech from qualifying as a “matter of 
public concern” under any circumstances,72 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certainly interpreted the case in that 
manner.73 In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,74 the 
Fourth Circuit held that school officials did not violate the First 
Amendment when they transferred Margaret Boring to another high 
school due to her selection and production of the play 
Independence.75 In finding that the play did not touch a matter of 
public concern, the court disregarded the production’s themes of 
“family life, divorce, motherhood, and illegitimacy.”76 Rather, the 
court viewed Boring’s selection of Independence as an assertion of 
her “right to participate in the makeup of the school curriculum”77 and 
concluded that the conflict between Boring and her principal was 
“nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”78 Although the 
Fourth Circuit looked to Kirkland and found it to be 
“indistinguishable” from the case before it,79 the court’s “matter of 
public concern” analysis was quite different.80 Whereas the Kirkland 
                                                                                                                 
 
make to focus on the context of teachers’ speech, “including the speaker’s role, manner, 
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 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800. 
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 See, e.g., Daly, supra note 56, at 18 (speculating that “the Fifth Circuit’s analysis seems 
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protection’”) (quoting Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800); Gee, supra note 56, at 435 (noting that the 
Kirkland court “limited its holding to situations where teachers refuse to implement curricula 
approved by school administrators”). But see Erica R. Salkin, Caution in the Classroom: K–12 
Teacher In-Class Speech, the Federal Courts, and Garcetti, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175, 184 
(2010) (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts have made a blanket determination that curricula 
are not of public concern, as decisions regarding curricula have historically been in the hands of 
administrators and school boards.”). 
73
 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (“In a case on facts so near to those in the case at hand as to be indistinguishable, the Fifth 
Circuit came to the conclusion we have just recited in [Kirkland].”). 
74
 136 F.3d 364, 366–67 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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 Id. at 366–67, 371. 
76
 See id. at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
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 Id. at 366 (majority opinion). 
78
 Id. at 368. 
79
 See supra note 73. 
80
 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368–69; see also Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse 
Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New 
Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (2009) (“While it is certainly easier to justify the 
restraint on teacher speech in Kirkland, in light of the generally understood rules on curricula 
that the teacher failed to follow, other instances of legal analysis applying these principles are 
less straight forward. Such was the case in [Boring].” The analyses in Boring and Kirkland are 
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court did not deny that teachers’ classroom speech, under different 
circumstances, could be a matter of public concern,81 Boring held that 
such speech could never satisfy that requirement.82 
A focus on the subject matter of a teacher’s classroom speech,83 
which neither the Fourth nor Fifth Circuits chose to do,84 could, in 
fact, usher teachers’ classroom speech past the “matter of public 
concern” threshold.85 In Cockrel v. Shelby County School District,86 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
First Amendment protected Donna Cockrel’s decision to invite 
Woody Harrelson to give presentations to her fifth-grade class on the 
environmental benefits of industrial hemp.87 The court looked to 
Connick’s statement that “matters of public concern are those that can 
‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community’”88 and found that “[t]here is no 
question that the issue of industrial hemp is a matter of great political 
and social concern to many citizens of Kentucky”89 so as to “clearly 
come within the Supreme Court’s understanding of speech touching 
matters of public concern.”90 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the 
Kirkland and Boring decisions, stating that “the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits have read the Supreme Court’s language [in Connick] too 
broadly”91 because their interpretation of the “matter of public 
concern” requirement would leave teachers’ speech without 
constitutional protection “even if about an upcoming presidential 
election or the importance of our Bill of Rights.”92 From there, the 
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inquiry); Vanessa A. Wernicke, Note, Teachers’ Speech Rights in the Classroom: An Analysis 
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Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of the Evans-Marshall 
decision, see infra Part I.C. 
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 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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 Id. at 1055. 
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 Id. at 1050–51 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 136, 146 (1983)). 
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court found that the principal’s prior approval of Harrelson’s visits 
undermined what would otherwise have been the school’s legitimate 
interest in preventing the disharmony in the workplace that resulted 
from the community’s negative response to Harrelson and his 
message.93 
Even if Connick’s “matter of public concern” requirement did not 
prevent a teacher’s speech from garnering First Amendment 
protection, the interests of school officials in restricting the teacher’s 
speech could outweigh the teacher’s interest in that speech.94 In 
Nicholson v. Board of Education,95 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that school officials did not violate 
Don Nicholson’s First Amendment rights when they dismissed him 
from his position as a high school journalism teacher for disregarding 
his principal’s instructions and encouraging students to publish 
articles in the school newspaper on sensitive topics such as “minority 
unrest in the local community, . . . police-student relations[,] and . . . 
the school’s treatment of the [F]ifth [A]mendment rights of 
students.”96 Citing the factors that the Pickering Court suggested 
could tip the balance of interests in the employer’s favor,97 the court 
found that Nicholson’s activities did not warrant First Amendment 
protection because Nicholson’s refusal to comply with his principal’s 
instructions undermined their working relationship and some factual 
inaccuracies in the contentious articles upset his fellow teachers.98 
B. A Teacher’s Right to Free Expression in a Forum with “Special 
Characteristics” 
In addition to determining the scope of teachers’ speech rights in 
the classroom by framing teachers as public employees,99 circuit 
courts also considered the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence specific to the public school environment.100 The 
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 Id. at 1054. 
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 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit 
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 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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 See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor 
Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 
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“famous trilogy”101 of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District,102 Bethel School District v. Fraser,103 and Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier,104 defined this perspective. In Tinker, Supreme 
Court held that school officials violated the First Amendment rights 
of a group of students by suspending them for wearing black 
armbands to protest the war in Vietnam.105 The Court stated that that 
“[n]either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”106 but also 
that these rights must accommodate “the special characteristics of the 
school environment.”107 To resolve the “problem [that] lies in the area 
where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with 
the rules of the school authorities,”108 who have “comprehensive 
authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,”109 the 
Court prohibited school officials from restricting student speech in 
schools unless such speech would “‘materially and substantially 
interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school’ [or] . . . collid[e] with the rights of others.”110 
Anything less, according to the Court, would transform schools into 
“enclaves of totalitarianism,”111 which, rather than “educating the 
young for citizenship,”112 would “strangle the free mind at its source 
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as 
mere platitudes.”113 Since the school officials made no showing that 
any disturbance was likely to, or did in fact, occur, the Court held that 
the school could not discipline the students for wearing the 
armbands.114 
From Tinker, the Court extended school officials’ authority to 
restrict student speech because of its effects in Bethel School District 
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v. Fraser.115 In Fraser, the Court held that a school district did not 
violate a high school student’s First Amendment rights by suspending 
him for giving a lewd speech during a school assembly.116 As in 
Tinker,117 the Court emphasized that the First Amendment does not 
have its full force in the school setting.118 Furthermore, the Court 
identified “habits and manners of civility”119 as a value “fundamental 
. . . to the maintenance of a democratic political system”120 and, 
accordingly, an educational objective.121 Because the Court defined 
the scope of this value to encompass “tolerance of divergent [and 
even unpopular] political and religious views”122 as well as “the 
sensibilities of others”123 and lewd speech in schools threatened to 
offend other impressionable students, it held that school officials 
could restrict such speech without violating the First Amendment.124 
Just two years after Fraser, in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,125 the Supreme Court set a new constitutional standard for 
“educators’ authority over [student expression in] school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”126 In Hazelwood, the 
Court held that a high school principal’s decision to remove two 
articles, one discussing pregnancy and the other dealing with divorce, 
from the school newspaper did not violate student journalists’ First 
Amendment rights.127 The Court found that the newspaper was not a 
public forum because the school designated the newspaper to be “a 
supervised learning experience for journalism students,”128 not a 
platform for “’indiscriminate use’ by its student reporters and editors, 
or by the student body generally.”129 Consequently, rather than 
allowing school officials to restrict student speech that is not lewd or 
indecent only when it threatened to cause a significant disruption or 
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disturbance,130 the Court permitted educators to “control . . . the style 
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”131 Under this test, the Court concluded that 
the principal’s censorship of the articles was reasonable in light of the 
risk that the articles posed for the invasion of the privacy of the 
individuals that the stories described.132 
Despite at least one court’s assessment that a focus on teachers’ 
speech in light of the special characteristics of the school environment 
“appears to be more speech-protective” than viewing teachers as 
public employees,133 before Garcetti no circuit court that adopted this 
perspective found that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s 
classroom speech.134 While no court adopted the Third Circuit’s 
position in Bradley that teachers’ classroom speech was not eligible 
for classroom protection under any circumstances,135 the judicial 
sensitivity to the unique environment in schools resulted in the denial 
of First Amendment protection for such speech for reasons that courts 
did not consider from the public-employee perspective.136 For 
instance, in Miles v. Denver Public Schools,137 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected John Miles’s claim 
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that school officials violated his First Amendment rights by 
reprimanding him for commenting on a rumor regarding students’ 
sexual activity on the school’s tennis courts during his ninth-grade 
government class.138 Relying on Hazelwood, the court concluded that 
the classroom was not a public forum and that a teacher’s classroom 
speech “b[ore] the imprimatur of the school.”139 From there, the court 
recognized that the school had a legitimate pedagogical interest in 
“preventing [the teacher] from using his position of authority to 
confirm an unsubstantiated rumor[,] . . . ensuring that teacher 
employees exhibit professionalism and sound judgment[,] . . . [and] 
providing an educational atmosphere where teachers do not make 
statements about students that embarrass those students among their 
peers.”140 Whereas the Ninth Circuit denied First Amendment 
protection to the journalism teacher in Nicholson because of the 
problems that his speech caused for the teacher’s relationship with his 
principal and fellow teachers,141 the Tenth Circuit denied 
constitutional protection to Miles’s speech because of its effects on 
students and the community’s perception of the school.142 
Just as teachers’ decisions to speak contrary to school policy 
transformed their classroom speech into an “ordinary employment 
dispute”143 under Pickering-Connick,144 Hazelwood’s “legitimate 
public concern” standard did not yield First Amendment protection 
for teachers’ classroom speech that violated school officials’ 
guidelines, although the judicial inquiry did involve at least some 
consideration of the schools’ reasons for the speech restriction.145 In 
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District,146 for example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Cecilia 
Lacks’s termination for allowing her high school students to use 
profanity in their creative writing did not violate the First 
Amendment.147 Citing Fraser’s pronouncement that schools are 
responsible for “teaching students the boundaries of socially 
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appropriate behavior,”148 the court found that the school board had a 
legitimate pedagogical concern in its “flat prohibition on profanity in 
the classroom.”149  
Whereas the importance of the content of teachers’ classroom 
speech earned it First Amendment protection in at least two cases 
when courts treated teachers as public employees,150 the potential 
significance of the subject matter of teachers’ speech did not even 
enter the judicial calculus in determining what constituted a school’s 
legitimate pedagogical concern.151 For instance, in Ward v. Hickey,152 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the 
First Amendment did not protect Toby Klang Ward’s discussion of 
aborting fetuses with Down’s Syndrome in her ninth-grade biology 
class.153 Considering “educators[’ ability to] . . . limit the content of 
school-sponsored speech as long as the limitations are ‘reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,’”154 the court reasoned 
that the school’s decision not to renew Ward’s contract because of her 
instructional choice was appropriate in light of the “age and 
sophistication of [her] students.”155 Unlike the Sixth Circuit in 
Cockrel,156 the court did not consider, and Ward did not argue, that 
the political and social relevance of the topic made it appropriate for 
discussion in class.157 
C. A Teacher’s Right to Free Expression in the Classroom When the 
School Speaks 
The third First Amendment perspective that influenced at least one 
court’s consideration of teachers’ First Amendment rights to free 
expression in the classroom before Garcetti identifies the school 
itself, or perhaps, more properly, school officials or the local board of 
education, as the speaker rather than the teacher.158 This approach 
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arose out of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rust v. Sullivan159 and 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.160 In 
Rust, the Court upheld a federal regulation that prohibited health care 
providers who accepted federal funding for family-planning services 
from offering any services that might lead to abortion, including 
counseling and referrals.161 The Court emphasized that “the 
government ‘may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds.”162 Further, the Court announced that “[t]he Government can, 
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, 
without at the same time, funding an alternative program which seeks 
to deal with the problem in another way.”163 Because the regulations 
were consistent with the purpose and scope of the federal grant, the 
Court held that they did not violate the health care providers’ First 
Amendment rights, noting that “[t]o hold that the Government 
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it 
chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible 
goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily 
discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government 
programs constitutionally suspect.”164 
The Supreme Court clarified Rust’s reach in Rosenberger v. 
Rectors of Virginia.165 In Rosenberger, the Court held that the 
University of Virginia violated the First Amendment rights of 
students in a campus organization that published a magazine with a 
Christian viewpoint by declining to authorize payment of the group’s 
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printing bill from the university’s student activities fund.166 The Court 
stated that “[w]hen the University determines the content of the 
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have 
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not 
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to 
convey its own message.”167 The University’s restriction on the 
distribution of student activities funds to student groups that espoused 
a religious perspective, according to the Court, was impermissible 
because it did not involve the university’s own speech or an attempt 
to promote a message that university endorsed, but rather was an 
instance of viewpoint discrimination against “private persons whose 
speech it facilitate[d].”168 
Although the choice to view schools as speakers through Rust and 
Rosenberger did not command a majority of any circuit court before 
Garcetti,169 at least one judge believed that courts should adopt this 
First Amendment perspective and hold that teachers’ classroom 
speech warrants no constitutional protection.170 In Evans-Marshall v. 
Board of Education,171 the Sixth Circuit held that the First 
Amendment protected Shelly Evans-Marshall’s use of the novels 
Siddhartha, Fahrenheit 451, and To Kill a Mockingbird and the 
movie Romeo + Juliet in her high school English class because the 
“main themes of the work[s] . . . [such as] race and justice in the 
American South . . . [are] matter[s] of public concern”172 and the 
school board’s purchase and approval of the materials “undercut[] the 
interest[] of [school officials] in controlling the workplace.”173 In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Sutton agreed with the majority in that the 
Sixth Circuit’s precedent, mostly notably Cockrel, compelled a 
finding in favor of Evans-Marshall.174 On the other hand, Judge 
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concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment applies to a 
teacher’s classroom speech, and there is good reason to think that it would not do so.”). 
171
 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005). 
172
 Id. at 226–27, 231. 
173
 Id. at 231. 
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 See id. at 234 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Given our case law, the path that Judge Cole 
has taken in resolving this dispute is the path that has been charted for us.”). 
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Sutton suggested that “[w]hen Evans-Marshall asked her students to 
read [To Kill a Mockingbird, Siddhartha, and Fahrenheit 451], it was 
not her speech that was at issue but the school district’s.”175 
According to Judge Sutton, “[t]he school district bears responsibility 
for the speech, and for First Amendment purposes it therefore is the 
speaker and it therefore has the right to retain control of the speech—
or, more precisely, to retain control over what is being taught in the 
classroom.”176 
D. A First Amendment Figure’s Right to Free Expression in the 
Classroom 
The final First Amendment perspective that circuit courts 
considered prior to Garcetti in evaluating the degree to which the 
Constitution protected teachers’ classroom speech framed teachers as 
First Amendment figures.177 To determine the constitutional effects of 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of academic freedom on teachers’ 
classroom speech, circuit courts looked primarily to Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire,178 Keyishian v. Board of Regents,179 and Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.180 In Sweezy, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court held that a professor’s conviction for contempt after 
refusing to cooperate with the Attorney General’s investigation 
pursuant to the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951 
violated the Due Process Clause.181 Though the plurality had high 
praise for academic freedom,182 circuit courts took more guidance 
from Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence,183 which declared that: 




 Id. at 235. 
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 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of 
Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d 794 (5th 
Cir. 1989). But see Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
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 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
180
 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236–46, 254–55 (plurality opinion). 
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 Id. at 250 (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
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those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so 
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remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
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 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 237 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Miles v. Denver Pub. 
Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., 
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It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation . . .  [and] in which . . . prevail ‘the four essential 
freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how 
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.184 
Ten years after Sweezy, the Supreme Court’s decision in Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents185 provided an “ardent tribute to academic 
freedom . . . [that] validated the idea that [the value] was something 
that courts and the Constitution must nurture.”186 In Keyishian, the 
Court invalidated a New York law requiring loyalty oaths of all 
employees in public higher education, finding the law to be 
impermissibly vague.187 The court stated that “[o]ur Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned”188 and dubbed academic freedom “a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.”189 Unlike the Court’s praise for 
academic freedom in Sweezy,190 which emphasized the importance of 
a university’s independence, the Court’s rhetoric in Keyishian focused 
on the value of recognizing teachers’ First Amendment rights.191 
After Keyishian, the Court’s next significant endorsement of 
academic freedom did not come until 1967192 in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.193 In Bakke, the Court held that the 
special admissions program of the University of California at Davis’s 
Medical School violated the Equal Protection Clause.194 Despite the 
Court’s holding invalidating the admissions program, Justice Powell’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
concurring); see also JOAN DELFATTORE, KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING: ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
AND FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 225 (2010) (“By far the most 
significant reference to academic freedom in Sweezy appears in Frankfurter’s concurrence.”). 
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 See supra notes 174, 176 and accompanying text.  
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 E.g., JOAN DELFATTORE, KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND 
FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 225 (2010). 
192
 See DUPRE, supra note 10, at 221 (noting the waning of the Court’s concern for 
academic freedom after the Red Scare). 
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 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
194
 Id. at 271 (opinion of Powell, J.) 
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opinion, relying on both Sweezy and Keyishian, recognized that 
“[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the 
First Amendment.”195 This “constitutional interest[],”196 according to 
Justice Powell, made the university’s aim of admitting those students 
who would “contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas’”197 
a “goal that is of paramount importance.”198 
Though the Supreme Court’s decisions have left contours of 
academic freedom uncertain,199 only one circuit court before Garcetti 
expressly denied the possibility that this “special concern of the First 
Amendment”200 includes teachers’ classroom speech within its 
scope.201 In Miles, the Tenth Circuit rejected the teacher’s argument 
that school officials violated his “[F]irst [A]mendment academic 
freedom rights.”202 Citing Bakke, the court noted that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has recognized a university’s institutional right to academic 
freedom,”203 but stated that it could not find enough precedential 
support for extending this right to an individual teacher.204 Even so, 
the Tenth Circuit noted that the school district’s restriction on the 
teacher’s classroom speech “simply [did] not threaten to ‘cast a pall 
of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”205 
Most circuit courts acknowledged that teachers’ classroom speech 
implicates academic freedom, but this recognition rarely affected the 
ability of school officials to restrict such speech from either the 
public-employee or school-environment perspective.206 In Bradley, 
Boring, and Kirkland, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, 
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 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). 
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 See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 174 (2010) (“It is . . . not 
entirely clear whether . . . constitutional [academic] freedom is concerned solely with the 
institutional autonomy of universities or whether it also protects, in some contexts, individual 
professors and teachers.”); DUPRE, supra note 10, at 206 (“Scholars and commentators have 
written volumes about the contours (or lack thereof) of the elusive concept of academic 
freedom, in confusing and overwhelming variety.”). 
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 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
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 See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991); accord. Evans-
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 228, 237–38 (Sutton, J., concurring) (suggesting that a 
recognition of teachers’ academic freedom “risks transforming many employment disputes into 
First Amendment retaliation claims”). For a discussion of the Miles case, see supra notes 137–
42 and accompanying text.  
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 Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
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 But see Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 228, 237–38 (Sutton, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that a recognition of teachers’ academic freedom “risks transforming many 
employment disputes into First Amendment retaliation claims”). 
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respectively, noted that Keyishian’s notion of academic freedom 
provided some degree of First Amendment protection for teachers, 
but stated that it did not grant teachers the right to contravene the 
official curriculum.207 The First Circuit’s decision in Ward represents 
perhaps the most influence that supplemental focus on teachers as 
First Amendment figures had on teachers’ rights to free expression in 
the classroom.208 While permitting school officials to restrict teachers’ 
classroom speech, due to the unique environment in schools, out of 
any legitimate pedagogical concern, the Ward court, in light of 
Keyishian, required schools to provide teachers with notice of official 
restrictions on such speech.209 
II. GARCETTI AND ITS EFFECTS ON TEACHERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS IN THE CLASSROOM 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,210 the Supreme Court rejected the First 
Amendment retaliation claim of Richard Ceballos, a deputy district 
attorney, and, in the process, shifted its public employee speech 
jurisprudence so as to create a “categorical exclusion . . . [for] First 
Amendment protection against official retaliation for things said on 
the job.”211 Ceballos’s claim stemmed from his investigation of a 
defense attorney’s complaint regarding misrepresentations in an 
affidavit that police used to obtain a search warrant.212 Finding that 
the affidavit contained certain inaccuracies, Ceballos informed his 
supervisors and prepared a disposition memorandum recommending 
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 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (quoting Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989)) 
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 See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this case, 
see supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. 
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 Ward, 996 F2d at 452. Cf. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 
723 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Ward’s notice requirement to evaluate whether the First 
Amendment protected a teacher’s classroom speech and noting that it was “satisfied that [the 
teacher] was provided with enough notice by the school board that profanity was not to be 
allowed in her classroom” without expressly adopting the requirement). 
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 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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 Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
212
 Id. at 413–14 (majority opinion). 
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the dismissal of the case.213 Despite Ceballos’s recommendation, the 
case continued and the defense attorney called Ceballos to testify 
about the affidavit.214 After this series of events, Ceballos claimed 
that his supervisors retaliated against him by reassigning him to a 
different position, transferring him to another courthouse, and 
denying him a promotion.215  
In determining that the First Amendment did not protect 
Ceballos’s speech, the Court emphasized the importance of a public 
employer’s ability to control the words and actions of its employees 
in order to ensure “the efficient provision of public services,”216 
holding that “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communication from employer discipline.”217 As a result of 
Garcetti, a public employee’s speech must be not “pursuant to [that 
employee’s] official duties”218 and on a matter of public concern in 
order to be eligible for First Amendment protection.219 
Justice Souter dissented from the majority’s opinion, expressing 
his concerns that the categorical exclusion from First Amendment 
protection of public employees’ speech in the course of their 
employment duties could “imperil . . . academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”220 The majority was careful to 
acknowledge Justice Souter’s concern, stating that “[t]here is some 
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests.”221 
In light of this recognition, the Court made it clear that Garcetti’s 
application to “a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching” was uncertain.222  
Despite Garcetti’s caveat, in Mayer v. Monroe County Community 
School Corporation,223 the first post-Garcetti case involving a 
teacher’s classroom speech to reach a circuit court,224 the Seventh 
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 Id. It must also, of course, survive Pickering’s balancing inquiry in order to receive 
constitutional protection. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
220
 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion). 
221




 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
224
 See, e.g., McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 32, at 224; Waldman, supra note 10, at 85. 
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Circuit applied Garcetti to deny the teacher’s expression 
constitutional protection. The court held that school officials did not 
violate Deborah Mayer’s First Amendment rights by terminating her 
for telling her elementary school students about her participation in 
political demonstrations against the war in Iraq during a current-
events lesson.225 Because the teacher conceded that the lesson was 
part of her official duties, the court stated that “if Garcetti supplies 
the rule of decision, then the school district prevails without further 
ado.”226 The court also dismissed the teacher’s argument that 
academic freedom exempted her speech from Garcetti’s reach, 
finding that “[c]hildren who attend school because they must ought 
not be subject to teachers’ idiosyncratic perspectives”227 but noting 
that “[h]ow much room is left for constitutional protection of 
scholarly viewpoints in post-secondary education was left open in 
Garcetti . . . and need not be resolved today.”228  
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit accepted the 
Supreme Court’s invitation to refrain from applying Garcetti to a case 
involving classroom speech when it faced the issue in Lee v. York 
County School Division.229 In Lee, the court held that the First 
Amendment did not protect the materials with religious themes that 
William Lee posted on a bulletin board in his high school Spanish 
classroom.230 The court analyzed Lee’s claim from the public-
employee perspective, but decided not to apply Garcetti because 
“[t]he [Supreme] Court explicitly did not decide whether this analysis 
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
teaching.”231 Under a Pickering-Connick analysis, then, following the 
path that its Boring decision established,232 once the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the teacher’s speech was “curricular in nature”233 
because the bulletin board materials “[bore] the imprimatur of . . . [the 
school] and . . . were designed to impart particular knowledge to the 
students,”234 the court’s conclusion that Lee’s complaint not a matter 
of public concern and, therefore, “nothing more than an ordinary 
employment dispute” followed.235 
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 Id. at 700. 
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Whereas the teachers in Lee and Mayer may not have lost First 
Amendment protection for their speech as a result of the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuits’ responses to Garcetti,236 the teacher at the center of 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Evans-Marshall v. Board of 
Education237 certainly did.238 In Evans-Marshall, Shelly Evans-
Marshall appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the school board and its finding that the First Amendment did 
not protect her use of the novel Siddhartha in her high school English 
class.239 The court followed its Cockrel decision in determining that 
the teacher’s speech touched a matter of public concern because the 
novel’s topic was “‘of . . . concern to the community.’”240 Further, the 
court pointed to the school board’s purchase of Siddhartha as a factor 
that tipped the Pickering balancing inquiry in Evans-Marshall’s 
favor.241 Notwithstanding these findings, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that Garcetti made them “beside the point.”242 Rejecting the teacher’s 
argument that Garcetti should not apply, the court looked to Justice 
Souter’s dissent in limiting the scope of Garcetti’s caveat to teachers 
at public colleges and universities.243 For the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he 
concept of ‘academic freedom’ . . . does not readily apply to in-class 
curricular speech at the high school level”244 because “[a]s a cultural 
and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and 
implemented in the university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are 
also researchers or scholars—work not generally expected of 
elementary and secondary school teachers.’”245 
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 The Fourth Circuit’s response to Garcetti involved the same approach that the court 
used prior to Garcetti: Boring’s categorical denial of constitutional protection to teachers’ 
classroom speech. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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 Id. at 343–44 (quoting J. Peter Bryne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the 
First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 288 n.137 (1989)). 
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III. THE PROMISE OF GARCETTI’S CAVEAT 
Garcetti suggests that viewing teachers as public employees is the 
proper First Amendment perspective from which to begin an analysis 
of the protection that the First Amendment affords teachers’ 
classroom speech.246 Despite the obvious circuit split between those 
courts approaching this issue from the public-employee perspective 
and those adopting the school-environment perspective,247 not a single 
justice in Garcetti intimated that Hazelwood provided the more 
appropriate legal standard for teachers’ classroom speech.248 It may 
be fair to read Justice Souter’s concern that Garcetti would leave “the 
teaching of a public university professor”249 well “beyond the pale of 
the First Amendment”250 to signal nothing more the appropriateness 
of treating professors’ First Amendment retaliation claims through the 
public-employee framework. The majority’s response, however, that 
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence”251 suggests, at least on its 
face, that the public-employee perspective is the most suitable lens 
through which to evaluate the First Amendment claims of professors 
and teachers alike.252 
In the few cases involving teachers’ First Amendment rights in the 
classroom that have reached the circuit courts since Garcetti, it is 
clear that courts have received this signal.253 The most significant 
judicial recognition of Garcetti’s endorsement of the public-employee 
perspective came in Mayer.254 Rather than searching for the legitimate 
pedagogical concern behind the school district’s restriction on the 
teacher’s speech as it did in Webster v. New Lenox School District,255 
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the Seventh Circuit simply stated that Garcetti compelled the finding 
that the teacher’s classroom speech warranted no constitutional 
protection.256 The court did cite Webster for the proposition teachers 
“[do] not have a constitutional right to introduce [their] own views on 
the subject but must stick to the prescribed curriculum—not only the 
prescribed subject matter, but also the prescribed perspective on that 
subject matter,”257 but did so as part of its reasoning for rejecting 
Mayer’s argument that the principles of academic freedom should 
exempt her from Garcetti’s conclusion.258  
The Seventh Circuit’s shift is significant because, if there are 
grounds to make an exception for teachers’ classroom speech under 
Garcetti’s caveat, then the public-employee perspective holds more 
potential for such speech to receive First Amendment protection than 
either a judicial focus on the special school environment or the 
message that the school district seeks to convey.259 Even though 
teachers have failed to pass both Connick’s “matter of public 
concern” threshold and Pickering’s balancing inquiry in their 
attempts to gain constitutional protection for their classroom 
speech,260 viewing teachers as public employees is the only First 
Amendment perspective that has led to constitutional protection for 
teachers’ classroom speech.261 A focus on the school environment has 
led courts to find that schools have a legitimate pedagogical concern 
in restricting teachers’ speech for a number of reasons,262 even if the 
speech does no more than reflect the teacher’s “poor judgment.”263 
Furthermore, if a court views the schools, rather than teachers, as 
speakers, then schools can restrict teachers’ speech for no reason 
other than their disagreement with its message.264 
Of course, after Garcetti, determining whether the First 
Amendment protects teachers’ classroom speech from the public-
employee perspective only matters if courts also recognize that 
teachers are First Amendment figures. Garcetti’s caveat owes its 
                                                                                                                 
 
prohibition on a high school social studies teacher’s discussion of creationism in class did not 
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existence to the “constitutional interests”265 associated with academic 
freedom.266 If teachers have no stake in academic freedom, therefore, 
Garcetti should apply, and courts should deny First Amendment 
protection to teachers’ classroom speech as succinctly as the Seventh 
Circuit did in Mayer.267 While it is possible that the Supreme Court 
was only hesitant to apply Garcetti to “case[s] involving speech 
related to scholarship or teaching” in the university environment,268 
the majority’s language does not compel this conclusion.269 
Furthermore, most circuit courts that have addressed this issue have 
suggested that teachers have some interest in academic freedom.270 
Even though academic freedom’s application to teachers may be 
uncertain,271 Garcetti’s context—a dispute between an employer and 
an employee—makes it clear that the Supreme Court does not 
consider academic freedom to be a constitutional value that only 
universities enjoy.272 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Evans-Marshall 
demonstrates that at least one circuit court has misunderstood this 
message.273 After applying Garcetti and finding that the First 
Amendment did not protect the teacher’s speech,274 the Evans-
Marshall court added that the teacher could not “sidestep”275 Garcetti 
by invoking academic freedom because “[t]he concept of ‘academic 
freedom’ . . .  does not readily apply to in-class curricular speech at 
the high school level.”276 If the Sixth Circuit had stopped here, its 
conclusion would be consistent with one reading of Garcetti’s caveat, 
but the court went on to state that “‘it is the educational institution 
that has a right to academic freedom, not the individual teacher.’”277 
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 Id. at 344 (quoting Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 172 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
152
1234 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
This statement fundamentally misconstrues the role of academic 
freedom in Garcetti.278 While the Sixth Circuit may be correct in 
noting that, ultimately, academic freedom does not “insulate a 
teacher’s curricular and pedagogical choices from the school board’s 
oversight,”279 Garcetti suggests that it is, in fact, an individual right to 
some degree.280 
The Fourth Circuit has also failed to recognize the significance of 
academic freedom in Garcetti.281 In Lee, the court chose not to apply 
Garcetti because “[t]he [Supreme] Court explicitly did not decide 
whether [its] analysis would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to teaching.”282 The Lee court did not, 
however, cite academic freedom as the reason for this decision.283 
Since the Supreme Court couched Garcetti’s caveat in the principle of 
academic freedom,284 the Fourth Circuit should have conditioned its 
disregard of Garcetii on the recognition of that constitutional value. It 
is possible, however, that the Fourth Circuit, in relying on its decision 
in Boring for guidance in evaluating a teacher’s classroom speech 
from the public-employee perspective,285 impliedly acknowledged 
that academic freedom offered some degree of constitutional 
protection for teachers’ speech.286 Even if the court impliedly 
recognized that teachers are First Amendment figures, however, the 
court failed to consider how academic freedom would affect the 
Pickering-Connick calculus.287  
The role of academic freedom in the Pickering-Connick analysis is 
an issue that circuit courts have not addressed when determining the 
protection that the Constitution affords teachers’ classroom speech 
after Garcetti,288 but one that Garcetti raises. Prior to Garcetti, courts 
that viewed teachers as public employees did not factor academic 
freedom into their Pickering-Connick analyses.289 This may have been 
appropriate, but Garcetti indicates that this “constitutional 
interest[]”290 could affect the public-employee speech analysis 
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directly.291 If circuit courts choose to exempt teachers’ classroom 
speech through Garcetti’s caveat and apply Pickering-Connick to 
determine whether such speech warrants First Amendment protection, 
not only should they recognize that academic freedom is the basis for 
doing so, but courts should also consider it as part of the “content, 
form, and context”292 of teachers’ speech for purposes of Connick’s 
“matter of public concern” threshold. Some courts have refused to 
recognize the content of teachers’ classroom speech for this purpose, 
focusing instead on the rights that teachers assert through their 
speech.293 Garcetti provides a reason to add academic freedom to the 
rights that teachers may assert through their classroom speech.294 The 
effect of such an acknowledgement may make teachers’ classroom 
speech a matter of public concern per se, but if a per se rule against 
such speech existed prior to Garcetti,295 there seems to be no reason 
why one cannot exist in its favor in light of Garcetti’s caveat. 
CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to deny that circuit courts, on the whole, have not 
afforded teachers’ classroom speech First Amendment protection.296 
Furthermore, before Garcetti the Supreme Court was not particularly 
interested in resolving the circuit split regarding the appropriate 
constitutional standard to apply to the issue,297 and the Court has been 
no more receptive to petitions for writ of certiorari involving 
teachers’ classroom speech after Garcetti.298 Despite this, Garcetti’s 
caveat provides an avenue for lower courts to find that the 
Constitution protects teachers’ classroom speech.299 If circuit courts 
have not denied that the principle of academic freedom may apply to 
teachers,300 then they have grounds to avoid Garcetti’s categorical 
conclusion and apply the Pickering-Connick test to determine 
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whether teachers’ classroom speech warrants First Amendment 
protection.301 Considering a teacher’s right to academic freedom in 
the Pickering-Connick analysis would increase teachers’ odds of 
making it past Connick’s “matter of public concern” threshold. While 
this would likely result in greater First Amendment protection for 
teachers’ classroom speech, Pickering’s balancing inquiry would 
ensure that schools are still able to “inculcat[e] fundamental values 
necessary [for] the maintenance of a democratic political system”302 
without preventing teachers from contributing to the development of 
“leaders . . . through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of 
ideas.”303   
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